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1 Introduction
Psychologists have often pointed to the fact that individuals experience happiness by doing
well relative to some reference group. In economic terms, this observation refers to the
desire to keep up with the Joneses. That is, individual utility can depend directly on the
current levels of consumption of others. This paper analyzes the theoretical impact of the
desire to keep up with the Joneses on growth of consumption and output, and on optimal
taxation (along a balanced growth path).
Preferences do exhibit the desire to keep up with the Joneses (KUJ). This is shown
in several recent studies that aim to assess empirically the extent to which individual
utility depends on others’ consumptions. These studies are based on survey-experimental
methods, and on econometric analyses of panel data on individuals’ incomes and self
reported happiness.1
The theoretical impact of the desire to KUJ on growth of consumption and output was
analyzed in several papers. The results are, however, mixed. Brekke and Howarth (2002,
p.142) and Rauscher (1997) find that augmenting a standard neoclassical representative
agent model with the desire to KUJ has no effects on long-run behavior. In a framework
where individual utility depends on a consumption reference stock rather than on the cur-
rent levels of consumption of others (“catching up with the Joneses”), Alvarez-Cuadrado
et al. (2004) show that the desire to catch up with the Joneses raises (lowers) the consump-
tion growth rate if consumption exceeds (is lower than) the consumption reference stock.
In the presence of capital externalities (endogenous growth) the desire to KUJ results in
an increase in the balanced growth rate (Brekke and Howarth 2002, Carroll et al. 1997,
Corneo and Jeanne 1997, Liu and Turnovsky 2005). In the context of a continuous time
overlapping generations model with neoclassical production technology (without a produc-
tion externality), Fisher and Heijdra (2009) and Wendner (2009) show that the desire to
KUJ can reduce individual steady state consumption growth rates. Initially, the desire to
1Alpizar et al. (2005), Carlsson et al. (2003), Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), Johansson-Stenman et al.
(2002, 2006), Luttmer (2005), McBride (2001), Neumark and Postlewaite (1998), Solnick and Hemenway
(1998, 2005).
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KUJ may induce households to raise their consumption levels. The intertemporal budget
constraint, then, requires them to lower their steady state consumption growth rates.
This paper considers the impact of the desire to KUJ on consumption and output
growth within the framework of a continuous time overlapping generations model with
AK technology, gradual retirement, and exogenous labor supply.2 By setting the birth
rate equal to zero, the framework yields the representative agent economy, as a special
case. The model reproduces many of the results given in the prior literature, as indicated
above. In addition, the model offers conditions for the desire to KUJ to raise (lower or not
affect) the balanced growth rates. The implications for optimal tax policy are discussed
in detail.
The key factor determining the impact of the desire to KUJ on the balanced growth
rates of consumption and output is the development of total – that is, accumulated and
human – individual wealth with age. Total individual wealth may decrease or increase
with age, depending on the rate of gradual retirement. For a low rate of retirement, total
wealth increases with age. But for a high (enough) rate of retirement, human wealth
declines so strongly with age that also total wealth declines with age. Many of the results
of this paper depend on whether or not the rate of retirement is “low” or “high enough”
such that total wealth declines with age. A numerical estimate suggests that a “realistic”
rate of retirement is possibly “high enough” (in the sense discussed above). Clearly, in a
representative agent framework, wealth is independent of age. Thereby, the representative
agent framework can be seen (under qualifications) as a knife-edge case of the continuous
time overlapping generations framework developed below.
The paper shows two main results. First, at a balanced growth path, whenever total
individual wealth is nonconstant with age, every household responds to the desire to KUJ
by either raising its propensity to consume out of wealth (thereby lowering its consumption
growth rate) or vice versa. In particular, if total wealth rises with age, a household will
respond to (an increase of) the desire to KUJ by raising its propensity to consume out of
wealth (thereby by lowering its consumption growth rate). The reverse is true for the case
2This paper does not consider the desire to catch up with the Joneses.
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in which total wealth is declining with age.
This finding is explained by the fact that the desire to KUJ raises the concavity of a
household’s utility function. Households respond by shifting consumption to periods of
low consumption — that is, to the presence in case wealth rises with age, and to the future
in case wealth declines with age.
Second, those findings are reflected in an optimal tax program. Key to this program
is a lump sum transfer system that involves intergenerational redistribution. The redis-
tribution goes from old to young when total individual wealth increases with age, and it
goes from young to old when total individual wealth decreases with age. In both cases,
the desire to KUJ raises the optimal levels of intergenerational redistribution, which be-
comes more intergenerationally progressive (regressive) when individual wealth increases
(decreases) with age.
Section 2 of this paper presents the market economy’s structure. Section 3 discusses
the impact of the desire to KUJ on balanced (market economy’s and optimal) growth rates
and on an optimal tax program. Section 4 concludes the paper. The appendix contains a
number of derivations and proofs that were distracting when placed in the main text.
2 Model Setup
Population. An individual born at time v (“vintage”) is uncertain about the length of his
or her life. As in Blanchard (1985), the instantaneous probability of death (the death rate,
d) of a cohort is age-independent and constant over time. Also, the ratio of the expected
number of births per time unit to the size of the population — the birth rate (b) — is
assumed to be age-independent and constant over time.
At time t, the population size is L(t). At each instant of time, a new cohort is born,
the size of which is b L(t) per time unit. Also, at time t, the mass of people who die is
dL(t). Accordingly, for a large population size, the rate of population growth is n = b−d.
Population at some date t1 is given by: L(t1) = L(t0) e
n (t1−t0). Without loss of generality,
L(0) = 1, and L(t) = en t.
Let L(v, t) be the size of a vintage-v cohort at time t. Under this population struc-
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ture L(v, t) = L(v, v) e−d (t−v) = b L(v) e−d (t−v) = b en v e−d (t−v) = b eb v−d t. Similarly,
the share of a vintage-v cohort in total population at time t is: l(v, t) ≡ L(v, t)/L(t) =
[b eb v e−d t]/e(b−d) t = b e−b (t−v).
Production. There is a unit mass of competitive, identical firms. Firm i produces a
homogeneous output, Yi, according to
Yi(t) = A¯Ki(t)
α [E(t) Lˆi(t)]
1−α , 0 < α < 1 , (1)
where Ki is capital, Lˆi are labor services employed by firm i, and E — which is con-
sidered exogenously given by individual firms — represents a measure for aggregate labor
productivity.
We consider gradual (exponential) retirement. Labor supply Lˆ(v, t) per time unit at
date t of a cohort born at date v depends on age, (t− v), according to:
Lˆ(v, t) = L(v, t) e−λ (t−v) = b eb v−d t e−λ (t−v) = b L(t) e−(b+λ) (t−v) , 0 ≤ λ , (2)
where we refer to λ as the retirement parameter. Labor supply and population size are
related as follows to each other:
Lˆ(t) =
∫ t
−∞
Lˆ(v, t) dv = b L(t)
∫ t
−∞
e−(b+λ)(t−v) dv = β L(t) , (3)
where β ≡ b
b+ λ
∈ (0, 1] .
For a given population size, earlier retirement implies lower aggregate labor supply.
Given Lˆi(t) = β Li(t), we can reformulate (1) as:
Yi(t) = A¯Ki(t)
α [E(t) β Li(t)]
1−α . (1’)
Define the aggregate capital stock K(t) =
∫ 1
0
Ki(t) di. Labor productivity is given by:
E(t) = K(t) Lˆ(t)ε−1 , 0 < ε ≤ 1 , (4)
where ε is called the scale effect parameter.3 If ε > 0, a rise in the level of labor raises
labor productivity. The lower bound on ε ensures positivity of the social marginal product
3This is a special case of a more general specification, which was introduced by Groth and Smulders
(2008).
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of labor. If ε > 0, a balanced growth path exists only for n = 0, which we assume as of
here. Then, without loss of generality, L(t) = L0 = 1.
Firms maximize profits and hire factors from households on competitive factor markets.
In equilibrium, in a competitive framework:
r(t) + δ =
∂ Yi(t)
∂ Ki(t)
= α A¯ E(t)1−αKi(t)−(1−α) Lˆi(t)1−α = αA , (5)
w(v, t) =
∂ Yi(t)
∂ [E(t) Lˆi(t)]
∂ [E(t) Lˆi(t)]
∂ Li(v, t)
= (1− α) A¯Ki(t)α
[
Lˆi(t)E(t)
]−α
E(t) e−λ(t−v)
= (1− α)Aβ−1 k(t) e−λ(t−v) , (6)
where r(t) is the rate of interest, w(v, t) is the wage rate, and δ is the rate of depreciation
of capital. It follows: w(v, t) = w(t, t) e−λ(t−v). At date t, the “average wage” is given by:
w(t) =
∫ t
−∞ l(v, t)w(v, t) dv = (1− α)Ak(t), thus, w(v, t) = β−1w(t) e−λ(t−v).
Aggregate production is given by:
Y (t) ≡
∫ 1
0
Yi(t) di = A¯ β
(1−α) εK(t)L(t)(1−α) ε , (7)
where we use the fact that, in equilibrium, with profit maximizing firms, Ki/Li = K/L.
Define per capita output and capital: y(t) ≡ Y (t)/L(t), and k(t) ≡ K(t)/L(t), and
consider L(t) = 1:
y(t) = Ak(t) , where A ≡ A¯ β(1−α)ε (8)
According to the resource constraint, K˙(t) = Y (t) − C(t) − δ K(t), where C(t) is
aggregate consumption at date t. Let per capita consumption be c(t) ≡ C(t)/L(t). Then,
capital evolves according to:
k˙(t) = y(t)− c(t)− δ k(t) . (9)
Households. Time-t instantaneous utility of a vintage-v household is a function u(.) of
own consumption c(v, t) and reference consumption c(t). The first argument in c(v, t)
refers to the birth date (“vintage”), and the second argument refers to time. At time t,
an individual household may not only care about its own consumption, but also about
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how own consumption compares to the average consumption level, c(t), which serves as a
consumption reference level (as discussed below).
In this paper, we consider the standard case of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
utility function. We specify the felicity function as:
u(c(v, t), c(t)) =
[
c(v, t)
1
1−η c(t)−
η
1−η
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ =
[
c(v, t)
(
c(v,t)
c(t)
) η
1−η
]1−σ
− 1
1− σ , (10)
where 0 ≤ η < 1 is called the reference parameter, which measures the importance of the
consumption reference level. If η = 0, utility depends only on own consumption, and the
model reduces to the usual model with interpersonally separable utility. The desire to
KUJ is introduced by a positive value for η. If η > 0, utility is also derived from own
consumption relative to the reference level (average consumption).
The specification of the desire to KUJ is chosen to allow for the interpretation of
the reference parameter as marginal degree of positionality (Johansson-Stenman et al.,
2002).4 The reference parameter represents the fraction of marginal utility of consumption
stemming from a rise in c(v, t)/c(t). If, say, η = 0.2, then 20% of marginal utility of
consumption stems from a rise in the ratio c(v, t)/c(t), while the remaining 80% directly
come from a rise in own consumption c(v, t), holding constant c(v, t)/c(t).
Parameter σ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. If η = 0, the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution is given by σ−1. If, however, η > 0, both parameters,
σ and η determine the elasticity of substitution between consumption at any two points
in time.
We observe the following two sign restrictions. First, 0 ≤ η < 1 ensures positive
marginal utility of consumption and quasiconcavity of the utility function. Second, σ > 1,
which is overwhelmingly suggested by the literature, ensures decreasing marginal utility
of individual consumption and strict concavity of u(.) in c(v, t). In particular, these sign
restrictions imply:
σˆ ≡ (σ − η)
1− η ≥ σ > 1 ,
4Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) call η the “marginal degree of positionality.” For-
mally, define r(v, t) = c(v, t)/c(t), and u˜(c(v, t), r(v, t)) ≡ u(c(v, t), c(t)). Then η =
[∂ u˜(.)/∂ r(v, t) ∂ r(v, t)/∂ c(v, t)]/[(∂ u˜(.)/∂ c(v, t)) + (∂ u˜(.)/∂ r(v, t) ∂ r(v, t)/∂ c(v, t))].
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where σˆ represents the (absolute of the) elasticity of marginal utility, which increases in
the desire to KUJ. Notice that the chosen specification is consistent with Dupor and Liu’s
(2003) definition of KUJ: ∂ 2u(.)/[∂ c(v, t) ∂ c(t)] > 0.
At time t, expected remaining lifetime utility of a cohort born at date v is:
U(v, t) =
∫ ∞
t
u(c(v, s), c(s)) e−(ρ+d) (s−t) ds , (11)
where ρ is the household’s pure rate of time preference. The possibility of death (d > 0)
leads to a discount rate (ρ+ d) higher than the pure rate of time preference.
Consumption. Households do not have a bequest motive. They can buy fair life annuity
contracts from life insurance companies, for which they pay or receive the annuity rate of
interest ra. The contracts are canceled upon death of an individual. Actuarial fairness
requires ra = r+d. The annuity interest factor is given by: Ra(t0, t1) ≡
∫ t1
t0
[r(s)+d] d s =
(r + d)(t1 − t0).
Every household inelastically supplies labor services and chooses consumption at all
t ≥ v such as to maximize expected lifetime utility (11) subject to its intertemporal budget
constraint:5
a(v, t) + h(v, t)−
∫ ∞
t
c(v, s) e−R
a(t,s) ds = 0 , (12)
where a(v, t) stands for time-t assets (accumulated wealth) of a vintage-v household, and
human wealth h(v, t) ≡ ∫∞
t
w(v, s) e−R
a(t,s)ds is the integral of discounted present and
future wage payments. In the market framework, a household does not consider the
impact of its individual consumption on the consumption reference level.
Individual consumption levels are derived by applying Pontryagin’s maximum principle,
in the appendix. Define the propensity to consume out of total wealth:
∆−1(t) ≡
[∫ ∞
t
e
∫ s
t
r−ρ
σˆ
+ σˆ−σ
σˆ
c˙(τ)
c(τ)
d τ−Ra(t,s)d s
]−1
. (13)
Then:
c(v, t) = ∆−1 [a(v, t) + h(v, t)] , c(t, t) = ∆−1 h(t, t) = ∆−1 β−1 h(t) , (14)
5 The transversality condition required to prevent households from oversaving is:
lims→∞ e−R
a(t,s) a(v, s) = 0, or, equivalently, lims→∞ µ(s) e−(ρ+d)s a(v, s) = 0, where µ is the
shadow price of accumulated wealth. Budget constraint (12) follows from combining the flow budget
constraint, a˙(v, t) = ra a(v, t) + w(v, t)− c(v, t), with the transversality condition.
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where the second expression follows from the fact that there is no operative bequest mo-
tive: a(t, t) = 0. Consumption levels are proportional to total (accumulated and human)
wealth, with the age-independent factor of proportionality given by: ∆−1(t), which can
be interpreted as the propensity to consume out of total wealth. Notice that at any given
point in time, consumption levels are not equal across cohorts.
Consumption growth rates are equal across cohorts. Individual consumption growth
rates are given by:
gc(v,.) ≡ c˙(v, t)
c(v, t)
=
[r − ρ]
σˆ
+
σˆ − σ
σˆ
c˙(t)
c(t)
. (15)
Average accumulated wealth, a(t), is given by a(t) ≡ ∫ t−∞ l(v, t) a(v, t) dv. In a closed
economy (without adjustment costs), the following identity holds:
a(t) = k(t) . (16)
Finally, average human wealth, h(t), is given by h(t) =
∫ t
−∞ l(v, t)h(v, t) dv = β h(t, t).
Define x(t) ≡ c(t)/k(t). We are now ready to represent a perfect foresight equilibrium by
three differential equations:
gc(t) ≡ c˙(t)
c(t)
=
r − ρ
σ
+
σˆ
σ
[
λ− (b+ λ) ∆
−1(t)
x(t)
]
, (17)
gk(t) ≡ k˙(t)
k(t)
= (A− δ)− x(t) , (18)
∆˙(t) = −1 + ∆(t)
[
r + d− r − ρ
σˆ
− σˆ − σ
σˆ
gc(t)
]
. (19)
If (b, λ) À 0, there is a continuous inflow of new cohorts without accumulated wealth
(b > 0), and there is a continuous decay of human wealth of any existing cohort over time
(λ > 0). As a consequence, the total wealth (human and accumulated) of a new cohort
may differ from the average wealth, which gives rise to the generation replacement effect.
Generation Replacement Effect. The generation replacement effect refers to the difference
between average and individual consumption growth rates, which is based on the fact that
individual consumption levels change with age: c(v, t) 6= c(t), but a household’s individual
consumption growth rate is independent of age. Analytically, the generation replacement
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effect — captured by the term Γ(t) — is determined by the term in square brackets in
(17):
Definition 1 Γ(t) ≡ gc(t)− gc(v,.)(t) = σσˆgc(t)− r−ρσˆ = λ− (b+ λ) ∆
−1(t)
x(t)
.
Two observations deserve remarks. First, if λ = 0 (and b > 0), the generation replacement
effect is always negative (Γ(t) < 0). In this case, h(v, t) = h(t). That is, a newborn’s
wealth is lower than average wealth: a(t, t) + h(t, t) = h(t) < a(t) + h(t). Consequently,
the consumption levels of young cohorts are lower than the average ones. As the individual
consumption growth rate is independent of age, according to (15), and older cohorts are
being constantly replaced by new cohorts without accumulated wealth. By the very fact
that newborn cohorts — with consumption levels lower than the average consumption
level — continuously enter the economy, the average consumption growth rate falls short
of the individual consumption growth rate, gc(t) < gc(v,.)(t).
Second, the sign of the generation replacement effect equals the sign of the differ-
ence between a newborn generation’s total wealth and average total wealth: sgn Γ(t) =
sgn [h(t, t)− [a(t) + h(t)]]. If λ is high enough so that h(t, t) − [a(t) + h(t)] > 0, total
wealth declines with age. As consumption is proportional to total wealth, gc(t) > gc(v,.)(t).
As a consequence of the above remarks, there exists a strictly positive value for the
retirement parameter, λ¯(t), such that Γ(t) = 0. At a given date t, λ ≶ λ¯(t) ⇔ Γ(t) ≶ 0.
As the sign of Γ(t) plays an important role in the results presented in the following section,
we summarize these observations.
Lemma 1
(i) λ = 0⇒ Γ(t) < 0.
(ii) sgn Γ(t) = sgn [h(t, t)− [a(t) + h(t)]].
(iii) If b > 0, ∃λ¯(t) > 0 : λ ≶ λ¯⇔ Γ(t) ≶ 0; if b = 0, Γ(t) = 0.
3 Balanced Growth and the Desire to KUJ
A balanced growth path (BGP) is defined by constant growth rates: gk = gy = gc = g,
and ∆˙ = 0. Notice that, depending on the sign of the generation replacement effect, gc is
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generally different from gc(v,.). As all growth rates are constant, we omit time indexes as
of here. From (15) it follows:
Γ = −r − ρ− σ g
σˆ
= Γ(g
+
, σˆ) . (20)
For a given growth rate, g, Γ declines (rises) in σˆ if Γ > 0 (if Γ < 0). We can now
characterize a BGP in the variables (x, g):
xc = (b+ λ)
(r + d− g) + Γ(g, σˆ)
λ− Γ(g, σˆ) , (21)
xk = (A− δ)− g , (22)
where xc = x|gc=g, xk = x|gk=g, and we consider that ∆−1 = r+d− r−ρσˆ − σˆ−σσˆ g. Clearly, a
BGP satisfies xc = xk = x. Notice that ∂ xc/∂ g > 0, and ∂ xk/∂ g < 0. Given g < (A−δ),
a BGP exists if xc|g=0 < A− δ. Equating (21) and (22) yields a quadratic equation in g,
whose smaller root is:6
g =
B
2σ
−
√
B2 − 4σ [(A− δ)[r − ρ+ σˆ λ]− (b+ λ)[σˆ(r + d)− (r − ρ)]]
2 σ
, (23)
where B ≡ r − ρ+ σˆ λ+ (A− δ)σ − (b+ λ)(σˆ − σ) .
It is important to observe that the generation replacement effect has a second inter-
pretation. It represents the intergenerational consumption growth rate. As shown in the
appendix:
cv(v, .)
c(v, .)
= g − gc(v,.) = Γ . (24)
At any given date t, individual consumption grows with age when Γ < 0, and it declines
with age when Γ > 0. If Γ < 0, a new cohort’s total wealth, h(t, t) is lower than average
total wealth, a(t) + h(t). Consequently c(t, t) < c(t), and consumption rises in age. The
reverse holds when Γ > 0.
3.1 The Desire to KUJ
We now investigate the impact of the desire to KUJ on the balanced growth rates.
6The larger root is ruled out by the requirement: g < r + d + λ. To see this, differentiate h(t) with
respect to time. For a BGP, it holds: h/y = β (1− α)/(r + d+ λ− g), which is required to be positive.
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Proposition 1 The impact of the desire to KUJ on the balanced growth rates of consump-
tion and output depends on the sign of the generation replacement effect. In particular:
Γ ≶ 0⇔ ∂ g
∂ η
≶ 0 .
The proof is given in the appendix. From (22) it follows that the impact of the desire to
KUJ on growth, g, is opposite to that on the propensity to consume out of accumulated
wealth, x. Upon a rise in the reference parameter, either, the propensity to consume is
increased — at the cost of a lower consumption growth rate. Or, the propensity to con-
sume is decreased — at the benefit of a higher consumption growth rate. This observation
displays an intertemporal trade-off as regards the desire to KUJ. Consuming more today
rises one’s consumption relative to the reference level, ceteris paribus. If η > 0, addi-
tional utility is gained from a rise in c(t, t)/c(t). This benefit comes at a cost, however.
Consuming more today lowers tomorrow’s consumption possibilities, thereby tomorrow’s
consumption relative to the reference level, ceteris paribus.
The proposition shows that the benefit exceeds the cost if Γ < 0. In this case, initially,
for a given wealth level, a rise in η raises individual consumption levels — that is the
propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth — and, thereby, lowers the individual
consumption growth rate. Consequently, along the new BGP (with a higher level of the
reference parameter), the propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth is higher and
the growth rate is lower than along the initial BGP.
The situation is the opposite if Γ > 0. In this case, the benefit — regarding the desire
to KUJ — of (initially) raising the consumption level is lower than the cost of suffering
from a lower consumption growth rate (thereby from lower individual future consumption
levels relative to future reference consumption).
As a consequence, it is mistaken to assume that the desire to KUJ inevitably leads
to higher growth rates of consumption. At the same time, it is mistaken to assume that
the desire to KUJ inevitably leads to a higher propensity to consume out of accumulated
wealth. As long as Γ 6= 0, however, one of the two possibilities will apply. Figure 1 depicts
the result offered by Proposition 1.
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xkHgL
xcHgL
DΗ>0 HG<0L
DΗ>0 HG>0L
g
DΗ>0 G>0G<0
g
x
Figure 1: Impact of the Desire to KUJ on (g, x)
Corollary 1 Suppose b > 0 and λ = λ¯. Then the desire to KUJ does not affect the
balanced growth rates of consumption and output.
According to Lemma 1, if λ = λ¯, h(t, t) = h(t) + a(t), and gc = gc(v,.). That is, individual
and average consumption growth rates coincide. In this knife-edge case, the benefit of
consuming more today (relative to the reference level) exactly offsets the cost of lowering
the consumption growth rate. Consequently, in this knife-edge case, a marginal rise in
the reference parameter has no impact on the balanced growth rates of consumption and
output.
Corollary 2 Suppose b = 0. Then the desire to KUJ does not affect the balanced growth
rates of consumption and output.
In the proof of Lemma 1 (see appendix), it was shown that b = 0 implies that the gen-
eration replacement effect equals zero. Thus, with exogenous labor supply, a rise in the
reference parameter has no impact on the balanced growth rates of consumption and out-
put.7 This result was demonstrated for representative agent economies before (Turnovsky
7It is important to note that this result is true only if the marginal rate of substitution of individual
consumption for reference consumption is constant in time along the BGP (see Turnovsky and Monteiro
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and Monteiro, 2007). Clearly, the case of b = 0 yields the representative agent economy
as a special case of the continuous time overlapping generations framework.
Proposition 1 has its foundation in the response of individual households to a rise in
the reference parameter.
Proposition 2 The impact of the desire to KUJ on the balanced growth rate of individual
consumption depends on the sign of the generation replacement effect. In particular:
Γ ≶ 0⇔ ∂ gc(v,.)
∂ η
≶ 0 .
A rise in η raises the (absolute value of the) elasticity of marginal utility with respect
to individual consumption. If Γ < 0, a rise in η induces the marginal utility to decline
too strongly over time. Households aim to lower their consumption growth rates. Conse-
quently, households bring some future consumption forward to the present and lower their
consumption growth rates. As, initially, every individual household raises its consump-
tion level, average consumption rises as well. This reaction, in turn, implies a lowering in
aggregate savings. Subsequently the capital stock declines, and the new steady state is
characterized by a lower average propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth, x.
The response is the opposite if Γ > 0, in which case, gc(v,.) < g. A rise in η induces
the marginal utility to rise too strongly over time, and households aim to raise their
consumption growth rates. Consequently, households will shift consumption from the
present to the future.
The key to this result is the sign of the generation replacement effect. If Γ < 0,
gc(v,.) > g, and individual households respond to a rise in η with a rise in the propensity to
consume, x (rather than with a rise in gc(v,.)). If Γ > 0, gc(v,.) < g, and individuals respond
to a rise in η with a rise in consumption growth (rather than with a rise in x).
If λ = 0, then Γ < 0, and the desire to KUJ always raises the propensity to consume
out of total wealth and lowers the growth rate of consumption and output in a BGP. This
is true for all λ < λ¯. However, once λ > λ¯, the desire to KUJ lowers the propensity to
2007).
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consume out of total wealth and raises the growth rates of consumption and output in a
BGP.
Considering Propositions 1 and 2, the natural question to ask is whether or not Γ is
likely to be positive. Using one year as our time unit, we can obtain a rough estimate
of Γ. The following parameters have to be assigned values: (A¯, b, α, δ, ε, η, λ, ρ, σ). In
accordance with usual numerical estimates, α = 1/3, δ = 0.1, ρ = 0.018, σ = 2. The
values of parameters α and δ are the usual values for capital depreciation and for the
output elasticity with respect to private capital accumulation. Likewise, the values of the
preference parameters (ρ, σ) accord well with empirical studies. Less information is avail-
able for parameters (ε, η). Wendner and Goulder (2008) demonstrate that a reasonable
range for η is: η ∈ [0.2, 0.4]. For our numerical simulation, we choose η = 0.2. The scale
effect parameter can be shown to have only a minor impact on numerical simulations, once
n = 0. We choose ε = 0.3. In the present framework, the birth and death rates are equal.
As b = d, a value of b = d = 0.02 corresponds to an expected lifetime of an adult of about
50 years. Parameter values for (λ, A¯) are still missing. First, an estimate for the labor
force participation rate is β = 0.75. Given β = b/(b + λ), we conclude, λ = 0.007. Given
this value for λ, we can calculate a value for A¯ that is consistent with a reasonable rate of
interest and investment share: A¯ = 1/2.
This calibration implies the following: g = 0.02, r = 0.057, c/y = 0.74. Moreover,
λ¯ = 0.004. That is, λ greatly exceeds λ¯, and Γ = 0.002 > 0. For a reasonable calibration
of the model, the generation replacement effect is positive. In this case, Propositions 1 and
2 imply that the desire to KUJ raises the balanced growth rates and lowers the average
propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth.
3.2 Optimal Balanced Growth and the Desire to KUJ
Once market prices fail to reflect to social value of capital, the market mechanism may
yield a rate of capital accumulation that is not optimal. The present framework exhibits
two sources for market failure: a production externality (stemming from investment), and
a consumption externality (the desire to KUJ). The desire to KUJ was shown to either raise
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or lower the balanced growth rates, depending on the sign of the generation replacement
effect. Thus, a priori, it is not clear, whether or not the balanced growth rates in the
market economy are lower than optimal.
We characterize a utilitarian optimal balanced growth allocation, following Calvo and
Obstfeld (1988), Willenbockel (2008), and Wendner (2009). The time-consistent utilitarian
social welfare function takes the form:
W (t) =
∫ t
−∞
L(v, t)U(v, t) e−ρ(t−v) e−ρ˜(v−t) d v +
∫ ∞
t
L(v, v)U(v, v) e−ρ˜(v−t) d v ,
where ρ˜ is the social planner’s discount rate. In the following, we assume that the pure
rate of time preference and the social planner’s discount rate, ρ˜, coincide:
ρ˜ = ρ . (25)
Under the assumptions of n = 0 (as above), and ρ˜ = ρ, the welfare function becomes:
W (t) =
∫ ∞
t
{∫ s
−∞
b u[c(v, s), c(s)] e−b (s−v) d v
}
e−ρ (s−t) d s . (26)
As from here, we indicate optimal values by a tilde. Notice that r˜ = A−δ, while r = αA−δ.
As ρ = ρ˜, the social planner treats all generations alike: c˜(v, t) = c˜(v′, t). This implies:
c˜(t) = c˜(v, t). Two immediate consequences are: there is no generation replacement effect:
Γ = 0; and g˜c = g˜gc(v,.) . The optimal BGP is described by:
g˜c(v,.) =
r˜ − ρ
σˆ
+
σˆ − σ
σˆ
g˜ , (27)
g˜ = g˜c(v,.) =
r˜ − ρ
σ
, (28)
x˜ = (A− δ)− g˜ . (29)
Comparing the market economy’s BGP with the optimal one yields:
Proposition 3 At a BGP, the optimal growth rate, g˜, may exceed or fall short of the
market economy’s growth rate g. In particular:
g − g˜ ≷ 0⇔ r − r˜ + σˆ Γ
σ
≷ 0 .
Consequently, if Γ ≤ 0, g < g˜.
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Once market prices fail to reflect the social value of capital, the market mechanism may
yield a rate of capital accumulation — thereby a balanced growth rate of output and
average consumption — that is lower than optimal. As long as Γ < 0, this intuition is
confirmed by the present framework with AK technology and a KUJ consumption exter-
nality. As r < r˜, Γ ≤ 0 implies g < g˜.
The desire to KUJ strengthens the difference between g and g˜. According to Proposi-
tion 1, if Γ < 0, the desire to KUJ lowers the market economy’s balanced growth rate. The
optimal growth rate, however, is not affected by the desire to KUJ, according to (28).8
That the desire to KUJ lowers the balanced growth rate relative to the optimal one
can equivalently be stated by the observation that the desire to KUJ raises the average
propensity to consume out of accumulated wealth, x, relative to the optimal propensity:
x > x˜.9 In the pursuit to KUJ, households raise their consumption (more than optimal),
hence, lower their savings. It follows that the propensity to consume is increased.
If Γ < 0, growth enhancing policies enhance social welfare for two reasons. First, for
a given rate of interest, savings are too low as households overconsume in the pursuit to
KUJ. Second, firms underinvest, as the private rate of interest fails to reflect the social
value of capital. Both externalities contribute to a lower than optimal balanced growth
rate.
The optimal growth enhancing policy, along a BGP, involves two instruments: a (neg-
ative) capital income tax, and a system of personalized lump sum transfers (and taxes).
The capital income tax rate, τk, is required to equalize the social and private rates of return
to capital: r(1− τk) = r˜ ⇒ τk = −(1− α)A/(αA− δ) < 0. That is, capital accumulation
must be subsidized. The optimal capital income subsidy is necessary to ensure that the
market economy’s intertemporal balanced growth rates are optimal. Clearly, the desire to
KUJ has no impact on the optimal capital income subsidy.
The program of lump sum transfers ensures that the market economy’s intergenera-
tional growth rate is optimal (that is, zero, as private and social discount rates coincide).
8This result holds true when the desire to KUJ is represented by the marginal degree of positionality,
as proposed by Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002).
9This follows directly from: x = (A− δ)− g in both the market economy and the optimal framework.
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Let t = 0 be the date of introduction of the optimal tax program. The intertemporal pro-
gram of lump sum taxes and transfers must be such that for each individual household,
the present value of the respective lump sum tax-/transfer stream leads the household to
consume an amount equal to c˜(0). That is: c(v, 0) = c(0) = c˜(0) = c˜(v, 0), v ≤ 0. Such a
program can be implemented as a balanced budget tax-/transfer scheme for all t ≥ 0, as
argued in the appendix. Then, at t = 0, all individual consumption levels are equal (and
optimal). For a given and optimal k(0), c(0) is optimal as well. Moreover, as c(0, 0) = c(0),
Γ = 0 implying: gc(v,.)(0) = g(0) = g˜(0), where the last equality follows from the optimal
capital income subsidy.
If Γ < 0, in a market economy without taxes and transfers, c(t, t) < c(t). Thus, the
optimal lump sum transfer program must redistribute resources from older to younger
cohorts. We call such a tax program “progressive” in an intergenerational sense; the tax
burden increases with age. Likewise, if Γ > 0, c(t, t) > c(t), and the optimal transfer
program must redistribute from the young to the elder generations. We call such a tax
program “regressive” in an intergenerational sense; the tax burden decreases with age. Let
τ(v, t) be the present value of the stream of lump sum transfers or taxes of a vintage-v -
household at date t, where τ(v, t) > 0 (τ(v, t) < 0) indicates that the household receives
a transfer (pays a lump-sum tax) in present value. Also, let τ(t) ≡ ∫ t−∞ l(v, t) τ(v, t) dv.
Progressivity (regressivity) of the lump sum transfer system is then defined by:
Definition 2 A lump sum transfer system is said to be progressive if:
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
< 0.
A lump sum transfer system is said to be regressive if:
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
> 0.
That is, progressivity either means that the youngest generation receives a transfer, while
the average pays a lump sum tax, in present value, τ(t, t) > 0 and τ(t) < 0, or both
generations pay a lump sum tax, but the average burden is higher than the youngest
generation’s burden. Likewise, regressivity either means τ(t, t) < 0 and τ(t) > 0, or
τ(t, t) < 0 and τ(t) < 0 where the average burden is lower than the youngest generation’s
burden.
Proposition 4 (Optimal Tax Program)
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(i) sgn[τ(t)− τ(t, t)] = sgnΓ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0.
(ii) Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 < 0⇒ τ(t) < 0 and τ(t, t) ≷ 0⇔ τk ≷ τmk < 0 ,
Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 > 0⇒ τ(t, t) < 0, and τ(t) ≷ 0⇔ τk ≷ τm′k < 0 ,
for well defined lower bounds on τk.
The proof10 of Proposition 4 is given in the appendix. It specifies the lower bounds on
τk, τ
m
k and τ
m′
k . The proposition shows that an optimal lump sum transfer program is
progressive (regressive) when Γ < 0 (Γ > 0). For obtaining an optimal (egalitarian, as
ρ = ρ˜) intergenerational allocation, the optimal lump sum transfer program redistributes
resources from wealthy to poor generations.
A slight complication arises from the need to finance the optimal capital income subsidy.
As long as τk > max{τmk , τm′k }, the optimal lump sum transfer program imposes a tax on
the wealthy generations and grants a transfer on the poor generations. However, once
τk < min{τmk , τm′k }, the revenue requirement for financing the optimal capital income
subsidy becomes so dominant that all generations have to pay lump sum taxes. In this
case, Proposition 4 implies that the elder (younger) generations carry the major burden
of the lump sum transfer program when Γ < 0 (Γ > 0).
Proposition 5 Suppose, Γ < 0. At a BGP, the desire to KUJ raises the progressivity
of the optimal intertemporal lump sum tax-/transfer program. In particular,
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
declines (becomes more negative) in η.
The desire to KUJ raises the (absolute) of the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to
average consumption: σˆη > 0. As a consequence, the individual consumption growth rate
is reduced (see Proposition 2), otherwise, marginal utility would decline at too big a rate.
Intuition can be gained by the following consideration. As Γ < 0, total (accumulated
and human) individual wealth rises with age. Consequently, at any given point in time,
individual consumption rises with age. Every household lowers its consumption growth rate
by the same amount — that is, every household raises its consumption level proportionally
10The proof also argues that the optimal tax program can be implemented with a balanced government
budget at every date.
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to its initial consumption level. Thus, the youngest cohort entering the economy raises its
consumption level by the smallest (that is, a below average) amount. As a consequence,
the ratio c(t, t)/c(t) declines and so does Γ = b[c(t, t)/c(t) − 1]. The desire to KUJ
leads the consumption profile to become (even) steeper with age.11 The optimal tax
program responds to the steepening of the intergenerational progressivity with a stronger
redistribution from old (wealthy) to young households.
Finally, we turn to the case with a positive generation replacement effect. With the
optimal capital income tax in place, if Γ > 0, r(1 + τk)− r˜ + σˆ Γ = σˆ Γ > 0. Proposition
3 then implies that the market economy’s balanced growth rate exceeds the optimal one:
g > g˜. Moreover, the desire to KUJ further raises the market economy’s balanced growth
rate, according to Proposition 1. In this case, a growth enhancing policy is mistaken, and
it diminishes social welfare.
Proposition 6 Suppose, Γ > 0. At a BGP, the desire to KUJ raises the (intergen-
erational) regressivity of the optimal intertemporal lump sum tax-/transfer program. In
particular,
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
rises in η.
If Γ > 0, both total (accumulated and human) individual wealth and individual consump-
tion levels decline with age. As above, the desire to KUJ raises the (absolute) of the
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to average consumption. That is, a given nega-
tive individual consumption growth rate lets a household’s marginal utility increase at too
big a rate. Therefore households respond by raising the individual consumption growth
rate (that then becomes less negative).
As all households raise their consumption growth rate by the same percentage, wealthy
(young) households raise their consumption levels at an above average extent. Conse-
quently, the ratio c(t, t)/c(t) increases, and so does Γ. The the consumption profile de-
clines more strongly with age. The optimal tax program responds to the steepening of the
intergenerational regressivity with a stronger redistribution from young (wealthy) to old
households.
11That is, Γ = g − gc(v,.) = cv(v, t)/c(v, t), and Γη < 0.
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Propositions 5 and 6 are related to the curvature of the utility function. The utility
function is strictly concave. Roughly, with the wealth (consumption) profile increasing
with age, the desire to KUJ — making the utility function more concave — requires a
shift of individual consumption to the period with a low total individual wealth. Hence,
households raise their propensity to consume (they consume more earlier at life), and they
lower their consumption growth rate (they consume less later in life). The opposite is
true when the wealth (consumption) profile decreases with age. In this case, a household
gains from shifting consumption from the present to the future — that is, from lowering
the propensity to consume out of total wealth and, thereby, increasing its consumption
growth rate.
Proposition 6 has two important implications. First, if Γ > 0, an unfunded social
security system — as is in place in many countries — rises social welfare (independently
from the desire to KUJ). However, an unfunded social security system would lower social
welfare if Γ < 0, in which case welfare would be improved by a “reverse unfunded social
security system.” As a main conclusion, in order to be able to assess the welfare impact
of an unfunded social security system (such as a pay as you go pension system), the sign
of Γ matters.
Second, the desire to KUJ justifies an intergenerational “strengthening” of the optimal
social security system. If Γ < 0, the desire to KUJ justifies a strengthening of the pro-
gressivity of the optimal tax system. More funds need to be redistributed from the old to
the young. If Γ > 0, the desire to KUJ justifies a strengthening of the regressivity of the
optimal tax system. More funds need to be redistributed from the young to the old.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the effects of the desire to KUJ on balanced growth and optimal
tax policy in the framework of a continuous time overlapping generations economy with
gradual retirement, exogenous labor supply, and AK technology. The analysis yields two
main conclusions.
First, the effects of the desire to KUJ on a household’s propensity to consume out of
20
total wealth, and its balanced consumption growth rate depend on whether individual total
(accumulated and human) wealth is increasing or decreasing with age. If total individual
wealth is increasing with age, the desire to KUJ raises the propensity to consume out
of total wealth and lowers the individual consumption growth rate. The reverse is true,
however, when individual total wealth is decreasing with age.
The main reason was seen to stem from concavity of the utility function. The desire to
KUJ makes the utility function more concave. Consequently, households shift consump-
tion to their low wealth-period, which is early in life for a rising wealth profile and late
in life for a declining wealth profile. In other words, individual households raise their
balanced consumption growth rate if wealth is declining with age, otherwise they reduce
their balanced consumption growth rate.
The rate of retirements determines whether or not individual total wealth rises with
age. If the rate of retirement is large enough, the individual total wealth decreases with
age, otherwise it increases with age. Clearly, there exists a specific rate of retirement for
which the total wealth is constant with age. In this knife-edge case, the desire to KUJ has
no impact on the balanced growth rates.
Second, the above positive findings are reflected in an optimal tax program. Two
instruments are needed in order to decentralize an optimal allocation. A lump sum transfer
program ensures optimality of the intergenerational consumption growth rate at every
date t. A subsidy on capital income ensures optimality of the intertemporal consumption
growth rate.
The lump sum transfer system involves intergenerational redistribution. The redistri-
bution goes from old to young when total individual wealth increases with age, and it goes
from young to old when total individual wealth decreases with age. In both cases, the
desire to KUJ raises the optimal levels of intergenerational redistribution, which becomes
more progressive (regressive) when individual wealth increases (decreases) with age.
Key to these results is the difference between individual and average consumption
growth rates, termed “generation replacement effect” in the present study. The sign of the
generation replacement effect determines whether or not the balanced growth rates rise due
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to the desire to KUJ. A rough numerical simulation shows that the generation replacement
effect may well be positive. However, considerable scope remains for developing better
estimates for the generation replacement effect. One task for future research then is to
identify the conditions for which the sign of the generation replacement effect is positive
(or negative).
Appendix
Derivation of Individual and Average Consumption. For any individual, consider
the current value Hamiltonian:
Hc = u(c(v, τ), c(τ)) + µ(τ)[(r + d) a(v, τ) + w(v, τ)− c(v, τ)] .
For all τ ≥ t ≥ v, c(v, τ) is chosen such as to maximize expected utility (11), subject to:
c(v, τ) ≥ 0 ,
a˙(v, τ) = (r + d) a(v, τ) + w(v, τ)− c(v, τ) ,
a(v, t) given , lim
τ→∞
µ(τ) e−(ρ+d)τ a(v, τ) = 0 .
From ∂ Hc/∂ c(v, τ) = 0 and −∂ Hc/∂ a(v, τ) = µ˙− (ρ+ d)µ, it follows:
gc(v,.)(τ) =
c˙(v, τ)
c(v, τ)
=
r − ρ
σˆ
+
σˆ − σ
σˆ
c˙(τ)
c(τ)
,
where no individual considers its impact of individual consumption on the reference level.
Thus,
c(v, τ) = c(v, t) e
∫ τ
t gc(v,.)(s) d s .
Combining this equation with the intertemporal budget constraint (12), and consider-
ing the definition of ∆(t) in (13) yields: c(v, t) = ∆−1(t) [a(v, t) + h(v, t)], and c(t, t) =
∆−1(t)h(t, t) = ∆−1(t) β−1 h(t).
Considering c(t) = ∆−1(t) [a(t)+h(t)], the growth rate of average consumption follows
from: c˙(t) = b c(t, t)− b c(t) + gc(v,.)(t) c(t). ||
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Proof of Lemma 1.
(i) From the definition of Γ(t) it follows: Γ(t)|λ=0 = −b ∆−1(t)x(t) < 0.
(ii) As ∆−1(t) = c(t)/[h(t) + a(t)], Γ(t) = λ− (b+ λ) ∆−1(t)
x(t)
= λ− (b+ λ)a(t)/[a(t) + h(t)].
Thus, Γ(t) [a(t) + h(t)]/b = [(λ/b)h(t) − a(t)]. The sign of the term on the right hand
side equals the sign of Γ(t). At the same time, the difference between a new cohort’s and
average total wealth equals: h(t, t)−h(t)−a(t) = h(t)/β−h(t)−a(t) = [(λ/b)h(t)−a(t)].
(iii) Suppose b = 0. It follows: Γ(t) = b [c(t, t)− c(t)]/c(t) = 0.
Suppose b > 0. [c(t, t) = c(t)]⇔ [b/λ = h/k], where h/k = (1− α)A/[r + d+ λ− g] > 0,
along a BGP. Solving for λ yields: λ¯ = b (r+ d− g(λ¯))/[(1−α)A(λ¯)− b], which implicitly
defines λ¯. ||
Intergenerational Consumption Growth. We assume 0 < v < t. From c(v, t) =
∆−1(t)[a(v, t) + h(v, t)] and c(v, v) = ∆−1(t)h(v, v) it follows, for a BGP:
c(v, t) = c(v, v) egc(v,.)(t−v) = ∆−1(t)h(v, v) egc(v,.)(t−v) = ∆−1(t)β−1 h(0) eg v egc(v,.)(t−v) .
Considering that both gc(v,.) and h(0) = w(0)/[r + d+ λ− g] are independent of v:
c(v, t) = ∆−1(t)β−1 h(0) e(g−gc(v,.)) v egc(v,.) t .
Consequently, cv(v, t) = [g − gc(v,.)] c(v, t). ||
Proof of Proposition 1. In (g, x) space, the xk-curve is downward sloping, while the
xc-curve is upward sloping. We consider the shifts of the xc- and xk-curves upon a rise
in η. A rise in η has no impact on the xk-curve. From (21) it follows that for a given g,
∂ xc/(∂ Γ) > 0. Moreover, ∂ Γ/(∂ σˆ) R 0⇔ Γ Q 0. Also, ∂ σˆ/(∂ η) > 0.
(i) If Γ < 0, a rise in η raises σˆ, which raises Γ and shifts the xc-curve up. Consequently,
x increases and g declines.
(ii) If Γ > 0, a rise in η raises σˆ, which lowers Γ and shifts the xc-curve down. Conse-
quently, x declines and g rises. ||
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Proof of Proposition 2. Notice that σˆη > 0. From the definition of the generation
replacement effect, gc(v,.) = g(σˆ)− Γ(σˆ). Thus:
g′c(v,.) ≡
∂ gc(v,.)
∂ σˆ
= g′(σˆ)− Γ′(σˆ) ,
where g′(σˆ) ≡ ∂ g(.)/(∂ σˆ) and Γ′(σˆ) ≡ ∂ Γ(.)/(∂ σˆ). Considering Γ = −[r− ρ−σ g(σˆ)]/σˆ,
Γ′(σˆ) = [−Γ(σˆ) + σ g′(σˆ)]/σˆ. Thus:
g′c(v,.) =
Γ
σˆ
+
σˆ − σ
σˆ
g′(σˆ) .
We observe that σˆ − σ ≥ 0, and σˆη > 0. From Proposition 1, if Γ(σˆ) < 0, g′(σˆ) < 0.
Likewise, if Γ(σˆ) > 0, g′(σˆ) > 0. Proposition 2 follows. ||
Proposition 3. Considering (15), (27), and Definition 1, it follows:
g − g˜ =
[
r − ρ
σˆ
− r˜ − ρ
σˆ
]
+ Γ +
σˆ − σ
σˆ
(g − g˜) .
From reordering terms, Proposition 3 immediately follows. ||
Proposition 4. At every date, every household receives a lump sum transfer t(v, t) > 0
(or pays a lump sum tax t(v, t) < 0). Let τ(v, t) be the present value (discounted at the
annuity rate of interest, r+d) of the stream of lump sum taxes or transfers of a vintage-v -
household at date t. Without loss of generality, we only consider programs with balanced
budgets in every period. A balanced government budgets requires
∫ t
−∞ l(v, t) t(v, t) dv −
τk r k(t) = 0 for all t. Consider the intertemporal budget constraint with pi(v, s) = t(v, s)−
r τk a(v, s): ∫ t
−∞
∫ ∞
t
pi(v, s) e−R
a(t,s) ds l(v, t) dv
+
∫ ∞
t
∫ ∞
v
pi(v, s) e−R
a(v,s) ds l(v, v) e−r(v−t) dv = 0 . (30)
By the arguments offered by Calvo and Obstfeld (1988, p. 175), it can be easily shown
that (30) holds (every household respects its budget constraint, so the government bud-
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get constraint is implied to hold). Given there is no initial government debt, the main
consequence of (30) is that the present value of all primary deficits equals zero.
Now, consider any feasible optimal tax program with a date-t primary deficit:
pi(t) =
∫ t
−∞ l(v, t) t(v, t) dv − τk r k(t). The intertemporal government budget constraint
(30) implies:
∫∞
t
pi(s) e−r(s−t) ds = 0. The stream of all primary deficits can be added to
the cohort born at t = 0, without altering the present wealth of its lump sum transfer
stream. Thus, the cohort does not change its consumption decision, while the government
runs a balanced budget.
Next, along a balanced growth path, τ(v, v) grows at a constant rate, say γ < r:
τ(v, v) = τ(t, t) eγ(v−t). Considering a BGP, the government budget constraint can be
written as:
τ(t)
k(t)
= − b
r − γ
τ(t, t)
k(t)
+
∫ ∞
t
r τk e
−(r−g)(s−t) ds = − b
r − γ
τ(t, t)
k(t)
+
r τk
r − g .
Along a BGP, τ(t)/k(t) is constant. Thus, the rightmost term of the expression is constant
as well. So, τ(t, t) grows at the same rate as k(t), that is, g. Therefore, we can re-write
the intertemporal government budget constraint as follows:
τ(t)
k(t)
=
−b τ(t,t)
k(t)
+ r τk
r − g . (31)
(i) Considering c(v, t) = ∆−1 [a(v, t) + τ(v, t) + h(v, t)] we calculate the growth rate of
average consumption in the same way as above:
gc(t) = gc(v,.)(t) +
[
λ− (b+ λ)
1 + τ(t)
k(t)
− β τ(t,t)
k(t)
1 + τ(t)
k(t)
+ h(t)
k(t)
]
, (32)
where the term in square brackets represents the generation replacement effect, Γ(t), in
the presence of lump sum taxes and transfers. Clearly, Γ declines in τ(t)/k(t), and it rises
in τ(t, t)/k(t). The optimal allocation requires c(v, t) = c(t), v ≤ t ⇔ Γ = 0. It follows:
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t, t)
k(t)
= −λ
b
[
b
λ
− h(t)
k(t)
]
⇒ τ(t)
k(t)
=
−λ
[
b
λ
− h(t)
k(t)
]
+ r τk
r + b− g , (33)
where the second equality follows from (31). As discussed in Lemma 1(ii), sgn{−[b/λ −
h/k]} = sgnΓ. Thus, the first equality in (33) implies: sgn[τ(t)−τ(t, t)] = sgnΓ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0.
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(ii) If Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 < 0, both terms in the numerator of the right hand side equation
(33) are negative. Thus: τ(t) < 0. Next, consider Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 > 0. The optimal
lump sum transfer system must lower Γ. Equation (31) shows that τ(t, t) and τ(t) cannot
simultaneously be positive as τ(t, t) > 0 ⇒ τ(t) < 0. Also, τ(t, t) > 0 and τ(t) < 0 can
be excluded, as this would unambiguously raise Γ further. Thus, the optimal lump sum
transfer system requires either τ(t, t) < 0 and τ(t) > 0 or τ(t, t) < 0 and τ(t) < 0. In both
cases, τ(t, t) < 0.
Finally, define:
τmk ≡ −
r − g
r
[
1− λ(1− α)A
b(r + b+ λ− g)
]
, τm
′
k ≡
b
r
b(r + b− g − 1)
r − g
[
1− λ(1− α)A
b(r + b+ λ− g)
]
.
Considering (31) and (32), we can characterize the optimal lump sum transfer program
as follows. Suppose Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 < 0, then τ(t) < 0, and τ(t, t) ≷ 0 ⇔ τk ≷ τmk < 0.
Suppose Γ(t)|τ(t,t)=τ(t)=0 > 0, then τ(t, t) < 0, and τ(t) ≷ 0⇔ τk ≷ τm′k < 0. ||
Proposition 5. According to (33),
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
= −λ
b
[
b
λ
− h(t)
k(t)
]
. As [h(t)/k(t)] =
[(1 − α)A]/[r + d + λ − g], the ratio [h(t)/k(t)] rises in g. Given Γ < 0, Proposition 1
implies that (∂ g)/(∂ η) < 0. Consequently,
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
declines in η (that is, the expres-
sion becomes more negative). ||
Proposition 6. Consider (33). As Γ > 0,
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
> 0. As [h(t)/k(t)] rises in η
(via g), so does
[
τ(t)
k(t)
− τ(t,t)
k(t)
]
.||
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